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following passage of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989, which addressed
the insolvency of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation's depos-
it insurance fund, policymakers turned
their attention toward heading off a simi-
lar collapse of the Bank Insurance Fund
(BIF). After months of wrangling, Con-
gress forwarded the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA) to the White House
last November 27. As President Bush
signed the bill into law a few weeks later,
the BIF was roughly $7 billion in the red
— its first deficit since the 1930s.
The purpose of FDICIA is twofold: to
provide funding for federal deposit insur-
ance and to reduce taxpayers' exposure to
losses when depository institutions fail.
Due to the deteriorating condition of the
BIF. policymakers granted the FDIC an
additional S30 billion in funding author-
ity with little debate. The battle over how
to limit taxpayer exposure was heated,
however.
One way of reducing such exposure is
by scaling back the financial safety net
(that is, eliminating or reducing federal
deposit insurance coverage). Congress
has generally rejected this approach,
seeking instead to limit taxpayer losses
by improving the regulatory process.
Specifically. FDICIA forces regulators
to intervene earlier and more vigorous-
ly when a bank or thrift gets into
trouble, and to close nonviable institu-
tions promptly and at the least cost to
uninsured depositors and the deposit in-
surance system.
This Economic Commentary focuses
specifically on the early intervention
(prompt corrective action) provisions
in the bill. We review the origins of
mandatory early intervention policy
and the political economy arguments
for supporting it, discuss the specific
sections of the law that pertain to this
policy, and offer a glance at how the
new guidelines will impact the future
of the nation's depositories.
• Early Intervention and
Regulatory Forbearance
Economists have long contended that
prompt closure of depository institu-
tions minimizes the losses to uninsured
depositors and to the deposit insurance
funds." Prior to the 1980s, however,
most assumed that bank regulators
would act in the best interest of tax-
payers by closing insolvent banks and
thrifts in a timely fashion.
Professor Edward J. Kane was the first
to challenge this assumption, arguing
that a principal-agent conflict exists in
public agencies. According to Kane,
financial regulatory agencies are self-
maximizing bureaucracies whose pri-
mary task may be conceived of as
acting as the taxpayer's agent (the gov-
ernment's principal) by ensuring a safe
and sound banking system, hence mini-
mizing the public's exposure to loss.
But at the same time, regulators must
The prompt corrective action provisions
of last year's bill are simple common
sense. They say, in effect: "Regulators,
you should act earlier and more aggres-
sively when a bank or thrift begins to get
into trouble. Get in there, correct the
problems, and turn the place around, if
you can. And if you cannot, sell the
place, or close it down, before it becomes
a loss to the deposit insurance system
and a liability to the American people."
Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
Chairman, Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
ISSN 0428-1276cater to a political clientele who may be
thought of as intermediate or competing
principals. Furthermore, regulators are
sometimes motivated by their own self-
interest, which may not coincide with the
interests of taxpayers. These political
pressures and self-interest considerations
create socially perverse incentives that
make forbearance an attractive alternative
to early and forceful intervention in
troubled institutions.
Mandatory prompt intervention is one way
to provide regulators with the proper in-
centives to close nonviable depositories.
FDICLVs prompt intervention provisions
are similar to those proposed in 1988 by
economists George Benston and George
Kaufman, who saw early intervention as a
practical way of altering depositories' in-
centive structure and allocating scarce
regulatory resources.
Benston and Kaufman contend that the
advantages of such a policy would
accrue on four fronts: First, reducing
the regulatory burden on sound, well-
capitalized institutions would enhance
the efficiency of the financial sector.
Second, stepping up regulatory inter-
ference on deteriorating firms would
mitigate the risk-taking incentives em-
bedded in deposit insurance by impos-
ing more market discipline. Third, link-
ing regulatory response directly to an
institution's financial condition would
end misguided regulatory forbearance
policies such as the "too big to let fail"
doctrine." Finally, forcing regulators to
close an institution at or near the point
of insolvency would reduce the cost to
uninsured depositors and to the federal
deposit insurance system.
The escalating costs of closing insol-
vent thrifts due to capital forbearance,
combined with the BIF's mounting
losses, motivated legislators to strip
away a large degree of discretion from
bank and thrift regulators. Lawmakers
first incorporated the notion of prompt
intervention in the Comprehensive De-
posit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer
Protection Act of 1990. The Treasury
Department later included a similar
recommendation in its reform proposal















FDICIA CAPITAL CATEGORIES FOR
INSURED DEPOSITORIES
Significantly exceeds the required minimum level
for each relevant capital measure
Meets the required minimum level for each
relevant capital measure
Fails to meet the required minimum for any
relevant capital measure
Falls significantly below the required minimum
for any relevant capital measure
Fails to meet any specified capital measure
basis for the Senate and House bills ul-
timately signed into law by President
Bush last December.
8
Several researchers have shown that the
capital forbearance policies adopted in
response to the insolvency of the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration significantly increased the
losses now being borne by taxpayers.
One study notes that for savings institu-
tions closed from 1980 through 1988,
the most important factor in determin-
ing resolution costs was the number of
months the firm remained tangibly in-
solvent. Another estimates that for
savings and loans closed from 1980
through 1990, or projected to be closed
in the future, final resolution costs will
be $66 billion higher (in 1990 dollars,
excluding interest costs) because of de-
layed intervention. And work done
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land shows that regulators' failure to
take prompt corrective action against
the thrifts that did not meet capital
standards at the end of 1979 caused an
increase in direct real resolution costs
of more than 200 percent.'' Other
analysts have reached similar conclu-
sions concerning the resolution costs of
troubled commercial banks. "
• FDICIA's Prompt
Corrective Action Provisions
Armed with such information, policy-
makers devised FDICIA to restrict reg-
uiatory discretion, effectively ending
the long-standing practice of capital
forbearance. Regulators still exercise
considerable control in setting capital
standards, but their flexibility in apply-
ing those standards has been curtailed.
Specifically, FDICIA requires regula-
tors to step up their level of involve-
ment according to an institution's capi-
tal rating, which in essence means
fewer options for dealing with the most
troubled firms. The new legislation
expands the scope of regulatory action
while mandating a minimum regulatory
response time.
FDICIA ties the extent of regulatory in-
volvement directly to depositories' cap-
ital levels, which are divided into five
categories (see box 1): well capitalized
(Group 1), adequately capitalized
(Group 2), undercapitalized (Group 3).
significantly undercapitalized (Group
4), and critically undercapitalized
(Group 5).'
3 Each federal banking
agency must determine the required
minimum levels for all five classifica-
tions. These standards must include a
leverage limit (a measure of core capi-
tal) and a risk-based capital level. How-
ever, the law does authorize agencies to
enact new minimum requirements or to
abolish the leverage and risk-based
ratios with the consent of other agencies.
The only specified common standard
concerns the minimum leveraging for
any Group 5 (critically undercapital-
ized) institution. In this case, each agen-
cy must establish a level of tangible net
worth that is no less than 2 percent of
total assets and no greater than 65 per-
cent of the required leverage limit. Fur-
thermore, no institution mav make acapital distribution or pay a manage-
ment fee that would cause it to become
undercapitalized.
The new guidelines prescribe a specific
course of action for regulators to fol-
low when intervening in all three types
of undercapitalized institutions. Once
an institution becomes undercapitalized
(Group 3), it is given 45 days to submit
a capital restoration plan to the appro-
priate agency, which then has 60 days
to respond. The plan should specify the
company's recovery strategy, its tar-
geted capital levels, and its ability to
abide by regulations, and must be
approved by the governing agency.
Otherwise, the firm will descend into
Group 4. A Group 3 institution also
must restrict asset growth and obtain
regulatory approval before acquiring
other entities, opening new branches,
or developing new lines of business.
FDICIA strips regulators of much of
their supervisory discretion over sig-
nificantly undercapitalized (Group 4)
depositories as well. By law, such in-
stitutions must, if possible, 1) sell
enough shares of stock or subordinated
debt to become adequately capitalized,
2) merge with or be bought by another
institution if grounds exist for appoint-
ing a conservator or receiver, 3) restrict
transactions with sister banks, and 4)
restrict interest rates paid on deposits.
Regulatory agencies retain some discre-
tion in imposing other penalties, which
can include restricting asset growth,
changing or ending certain bank activi-
ties, and firing directors and senior
executive officers.
Institution
BOX 2 PRIMARY SUPERVISORS OF BANKS AND THRIFTS
Regulator
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Regulators have even less latitude in
dealing with critically undercapitalized
(Group 5) institutions. The appropriate
agency must appoint a receiver or con-
servator for such firms within 90 days,
unless that agency and the FDIC decide
that prompt corrective action would be
better served by other means. Institutions
cannot make any interest or capital pay-
ments on their subordinated debt begin-
ning 60 days after being designated criti-
cally undercapitalized. Furthermore,
regulators can prohibit Group 5 entities





Insured federal savings associations
Insured state savings associations




Savings and loan holding companies
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Reserve and state authority
FDIC and state authority
State authority
3
Office of Thrift Supervision
Office of Thrift Supervision and state authority
State authority
2
National Credit Union Association Board
State authority
Federal Reserve
Office of Thrift Supervision
a. The FDIC can intervene in the administration of these institutions to prevent a loss to the federal deposit in-
surance fund.
NOTE: The FDIC has some examination authority over all FDIC-insured institutions.
engaging in covered or highly lever-
aged transactions, making excessive
compensation or bonus payments, pay-
ing interest on new or renewed liabil-
ities, altering accounting methods, or
amending bylaws and charters.16
• The Short-Run Impact
of Prompt Intervention
FDICIA requires regulators to establish
the exact capital levels for determining
prompt intervention (see box 2). The
Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency
have proposed criteria for these levels.
At press time, however, the proposal
was still out for public comment and
had not been officially adopted. Al-
though the formal definitions may vary
from the current recommendations, the
differences will likely be minimal.
Using the proposed standards, table 1
presents a breakdown of depository in-
stitutions by capital category and asset
size. Based on March 31,1992 data.
91.6 percent of all banks, 82.6 percent
of all mutual savings banks, and 65.9
percent of all savings and loans would
be categorized as well capitalized. At
the same time, another 5.9 percent of
banks. 13.4 percent of mutual savings
banks, and 17.7 percent of savings and
loans would be categorized as ade-
quately capitalized.
Insufficiently capitalized institutions
(Groups 3,4, and 5) would account for
2.6 percent of all commercial banks
and 6.2 percent of commercial bank as-
sets. Among mutual savings banks, in-
sufficiently capitalized institutions
would compose 4.0 percent of the
sample, but only 0.8 percent of in-
dustry assets. For savings and loans,
the numbers are bleaker: 16.4 percent
of these firms and a staggering 26.4
percent of their assets would fall into
the lowest three classifications.
1
7 In
total, 654 depository institutions hold-
ing $450.2 billion in assets would be
subject to prompt corrective action
under the proposed guidelines.
Panel A of the table highlights an in-
verse relationship between capital
ratios and problem loans and thus pro-
vides a rationale for prompt interven-
tion based on capital health. For well-
capitalized commercial banks, Tier 1
capital (primarily equity) made up 7.85
percent of total assets, while problem
loans constituted only 2.59 percent.
Adequately capitalized commercial
banks had nearly 50 percent more prob-
lem loans as a percentage of assets
(3.82 percent) and held 31.34 percentTABLE 1 INDUSTRY COMPOSITION UNDER PROPOSED CAPITAL GUIDELINES (AS OF MARCH 31,1992)
Panel A: Commercial Banks
Number of depositories
Percent of total industry
Total assets
Percent of industry assets
Problem loans
Percent of total assets
Tier 1 capital






























































Panel B: Mutual Savings Banks
Number of depositories
Percent of total industry
Total assets
Percent of industry assets
Problem loans
Percent of total assets
Tier 1 capital















































Panel C: Savings and Loans
Number of depositories
Percent of total industry
Total assets
Percent of industry assets
Problem loans
Percent of total assets
Tier 1 capital















































NOTE: All dollar figures are in millions.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of ihe Federal Reserve System.
less capital than their well-capitalized
peers. For undercapitalized commercial
banks, the ratio of problem loans to
assets was nearly double that of ade-
quately capitalized banks, and these in-
stitutions had roughly 15 percent less
capital than their adequately capitalized
counterparts. Moreover, problem loans
exceeded Tier 1 capital for banks in all
of the insufficiently capitalized catego-
ries, and with the exception of signifi-
cantly undercapitalized banks, they in-
creased as capital decreased. A similar
negative relationship between capitali-
zation and problem assets was exhibited
by mutual savings banks and savings
and loans.
One should not consider these data a
definitive description of the health of
the U.S. depository industry. For ex-
ample, while only 291 banks with $208
billion in assets would be classified as
insufficiently capitalized and hence
subject to mandatory intervention, the
FD1C problem bank list contains 981
institutions with a total of $535.4 bil-
lion in assets.
l
8 The FDIC has also tar-
geted 70 mutual savings banks with
$72 billion in assets, even though only
19 such firms with $3.2 billion in assets
would be considered insufficiently capi-
talized under the proposed guidelines.
In other words, the prompt corrective
action classifications require further
modification, since they appear to pick
up only the most severely undercapital-
ized institutions. A recent study by staffeconomists at the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors concludes that
"...without substantial improvements in
the measurement of capital ratios (espe-
cially in the treatment of loan loss re-
serves and other real estate owned),
prompt corrective action policies will
not effectively target high-risk banks
for sanctions without continued heavy
reliance on discretionary interventions
19
by regulators."
Still, the problem loan and Tier 1 capi-
tal numbers presented here do provide
some valuable insight. For instance,
those institutions that fall into the criti-
cally undercapitalized group have little
realistic chance of recovering. In this
stratum, commercial banks and mutual
savings banks held problem loans
equal to 20 times and 10 times Tier 1
capital, respectively, while savings and
loans had problem assets equal to 14.1
percent of total assets and negative Tier
1 capital. Furthermore, it is apparent
that significantly undercapitalized in-
stitutions will probably not recover
without a substantial capital injection.
The table also suggests that FDICIA's
prompt corrective action provisions are
unlikely to disrupt the nation's finan-
cial system. While the potential num-
ber of firms and assets directly affected
by such intervention seems large, it rep-
resents only a small fraction of the in-
dustry and industry assets. Moreover,
those institutions subject to the most
severe regulatory actions, including
closure, are the ones that have little
hope of recovering and that pose the
greatest risk to the deposit insurance
system.
• Conclusion
The prompt corrective action provisions
in FDICIA represent a small step toward
limiting taxpayers' losses when deposi-
tory institutions fail. As Senior Counsel
of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Richard
Carnell states, "[FDICIA] neither ended
nor sought to end regulatory discretion in
supervising depository institutions." "
Rather, it clearly spells out Congressional
intent in regard to bank regulation with-
out dictating microregulatory decisions.
Though the number of capital categories
and certain regulatory actions are now
mandated by law, regulators retain the
authority to determine capital levels and,
to some extent, the course of intervention.
Under the currently proposed defini-
tions, 654 depository institutions hold-
ing $450.2 billion in assets would have
been subject to some form of correc-
tive action as of March 31,1992. How-
ever, they represent a small percentage
of the industry and a subset of the total
number of institutions considered by
regulators to be in danger of failing.
Thus, prompt corrective action is simply
a first step toward eliminating regula-
tory forbearance and its attendant per-
verse incentives for insured financial
institutions. By forcing more timely
closure or reorganization on sick de-
positories, the burden imposed on the
deposit insurance fund, and ultimately
on taxpayers, will diminish.
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